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Abstract
This study presents a novel theoretical framework to understand the impact of
monetary policy on wage dispersion and labor allocation. We build an endogenous
growth model with cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on R&D and two types of
workers, high- and low-skilled. The monetary authorities sets the nominal interest
rate to maximize welfare, which allows to study not only the impact on monetary
policy on wage dispersion but also to test the optimality of the Friedman rule (i.e.,
whether optimal nominal interest rate should be zero). The main conclusions are the
following. First, under inelastic labor supply, Friedman rule might not be optimal
for low economic growth rates. Furthermore, a positive but low interest rate can
contribute to a lower wage dispersion between high- and low-skilled workers. Second,
under elastic labor supply, Friedman rule seems to be optimal for all the considered
scenarios.
Keywords: Wage Dispersion, Labor Skills, Economic Growth, Monetary Policy.
JEL-Codes: E52, J31, O42
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Resumo
Esta dissertac¸a˜o apresenta um modelo teo´rico que pretende explicar o impacto da
pol´ıtica moneta´ria na dispersa˜o salarial e no crescimento econo´mico. Constru´ımos
um modelo endo´geno de crescimento com restric¸o˜es moneta´rias na I&D e com dois
tipos de trabalhadores, qualificados e na˜o qualificados. A autoridade moneta´ria
estabelece a taxa de juro nominal de modo a maximizar o bem-estar econo´mico, o
que permite estudar, na˜o so´ o impacto da pol´ıtica moneta´ria na dispersa˜o salarial,
mas tambe´m se a regra de Friedman e´ o´tima (isto e´, se a taxa de juro nominal o´tima
deve ser zero). As principais concluso˜es sa˜o as seguintes. Primeiro, no caso da oferta
de trabalho ser inela´stica, a regra de Friedman pode na˜o ser o´tima para baixas taxas
de crescimento. Adicionalmente, uma taxa de juro positiva, mas pequena pode
contribuir para uma reduc¸a˜o da dispersa˜o salarial entre trabalhadores qualificados
e na˜o qualificados. Segundo, no caso da oferta de trabalho ser ela´stica, a regra de
Friedman aparenta ser o´tima para todos os cena´rios considerados.
Palavras-Chave: Dispersa˜o Salarial, Qualificac¸o˜es de Trabalho, Crescimento
Econo´mico, Pol´ıtica Moneta´ria.
Co´digos JEL: E52, J31, O42
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1 Introduction
This dissertation aims to understand the role of monetary policy on wage dis-
persion and economic growth. To achieve this objective, we develop an endogenous
growth model combining employment, wage dispersion and monetary policy.
Since the two industrial revolutions the world economy, as a whole, has been
raising at incredible rates of growth due to constant increases in the productivity of
workers and machines. Following these improvements in technology, there was also
an increase in wage dispersion between workers, i.e., the earnings of the high skilled
workers have been rising faster than the ones from the low skilled workers.
Taking this into account, what is the relationship between monetary policy and
wages dispersion? In other words, could different monetary policies influence, posi-
tively or negatively, this apparent relationship between technology and wage disper-
sion? Regarding the economic relevance of this research, note that, to the best of
our knowledge, we present the first paper studying and combining the three fields
of research, i.e., monetary policy, wage dispersion and economic growth.
Hence, we developed an endogenous growth model with cash-in-advance con-
straints in R&D (as in Chu and Cozzi, 2014) and two types of workers: (a) high-
skilled workers who can be employed in the final and R&D sector; and (b) low-skilled
workers who can be employed in the final and intermediate good sector (as in Afonso,
2016). A monetary authority is introduced and maximizes welfare by defining the
nominal interest rate.
The main conclusion can be summarized as follows: (i) under inelastic labor
supply, Friedman rule might not be optimal for low economic growth rates; hence, a
positive but low interest rate can contribute to a lower wage dispersion between high
and low skill labor; (ii) under elastic labor supply, Friedman rule seems to be optimal
for all the considered scenarios; (iii) hence, a common monetary policy might not be
optimal for all types of countries (i.e., depending on the economic growth rate) and
can contribute to lower the wage dispersion between high- and low-skilled workers.
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: section 2 provides an in-dept
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literature review of this topic; section 3 presents and describes the model; section
4 analysis the impact of monetary policy on welfare; section 5 provides a sensitive
analysis of the economy; and section 6 concludes.
2
2 Literature Review
2.1 Identification of key concepts
This section provides a brief overview of the main concepts under analysis in this
dissertation.1
2.1.1 Monetary Economics
According to Walsh (2005, p. 1), “monetary economics focuses on the behavior
of prices, monetary aggregates, nominal and interest rates and output”. In other
words, monetary economics coordinates the actions/policies that must be set to
generate an increase on the overall welfare of economies. In a more specific topic,
Arestis and Mihailov (2011) describe monetary policy as the role of central bank
policies in the variations of money supply.
2.1.2 Structural Change
Matsuyama (2008) interprets structural change as a complex phenomenon, be-
cause not only economic growth foments complementary changes in various sectors
of the economy, just as output or employment, but these changes also influence the
economic growth, i.e., the growth process affects and it is affected by structural
changes.
2.1.3 Wage Dispersion
Mortensen (2004) defines wage dispersion as the unequal compensation of work-
ers who have similar productive attributes. Salverda and Checchi (2014) clarifies
the difference between dispersion and inequality of wages, since that it is very com-
mon to have different interpretations regarding these two fields. In a broad sense,
1This section closely follows the final report prepared for the unit Plan of Dissertation under
the subject: “The impact of monetary policy on wage dispersion and economic growth”
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for these authors, dispersion should be interpreted as the mathematical logic of the
word, i.e., when we consider a range of different wages, we should apply a numerical
approach only. This does not happen when wage inequality is discussed, because
wage inequality requires an analytical explanation of the data. Summing up, dis-
persion refers to quantitative analysis and inequality represents qualitative analysis
of wages.
2.1.4 Creative Destruction
Caballero (2008) explains creative destruction as an endless research process to
discover new production units that succeed the outdated ones and with this devel-
opment, economies are modified essentially in terms of long-run economic growth,
structural changes and economic fluctuations. This concept was first introduced by
Schumpeter and later on introduced in a famous economic growth model by Aghion
and Howitt (1992).
2.1.5 Economic Growth
Howitt and Weil (2008) argues that “Economic growth is typically measured as
the change in per capita gross domestic product”, but this is the general definition
of economic growth. According to the same authors, this concept can be defined as
“the increase in a country’s standard of living over time”, which is a more complete
version of the definition of it.
2.1.6 Endogenous Growth Theory
Howitt (2008) defines endogenous growth theory as the long-run economic growth,
but only the growth that emerge due to actions taken by forces internal to the econ-
omy, particularly the economies forces that allow technological change to occur by
managing the opportunities of growth created. According to Howitt (2008), in the
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neoclassical theory, long-run growth is taken as an exogenous variable. Hence, the
challenge for endogenous growth theory is to prove and explain how technologi-
cal improvements and long-run economic growth can be determined by economic
factors.
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2.2 Historical context and theoretical framework
For the purpose of this dissertation it is extremely important to understand the
historical evolution of the monetary theory as well as the different theories regarding
wage dispersion and economic growth.
In terms of monetary policy, there were many models related to the subject de-
veloped during the twentieth century. Arestis and Mihailov (2011) presents a compi-
lation of the most important research in the monetary field, from the first authors to
work exhaustively on the topics until recent times. They divided the branch of mon-
etary economics into three different sections: monetary theory, monetary policy and
public finance. According to Arestis and Mihailov (2011), the monetary theory com-
prehends theories such as the classical models of Fisher (1911), Friedman (1956),
and the Keynesian models from Keynes (1936) to Baumol (1952). On the other
hand, the monetary policy covers the topics regarding the relation between central
banks and money supply, with the systems of the gold standard (1776-1914) or the
Bretton Woods system (1944-1971) as the earlier main contributions for the area.
More recently we have the contributions of Lucas (1972), Barro and Gordon (1983)
and Gal´ı (2008), for example). Finally, the public finance can be characterized by
the classic theories of Ramsey (1927), which are being advanced throughout time
by different authors like Friedman (1960), Leeper (1991) or Benigno and Woodford
(2003).
Following the same pattern, the economic growth theory has been evolving par-
ticularly since the middle of the last century, with the contribution for the literature
from several authors demonstrating the importance of this field in the economic
environment.
Two of the first major contributors for the literature are Kuznets (1947) with his
article “Measurement of Economic Growth” (a few years later, this author derived
the well know Kuznets Curve, relating inequality and income per capita) and Schum-
peter (1947) where he developed the “theoretical problems of economics growth”.
A decade later, Solow (1956) develop what is considered by many the first long-
run economic growth model, commonly known as the Solow model, which is still
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used as one of the principal references of growth theory. Rostow (1959) is another
interesting approach for the literature with the idea of economic growth through
stages.
The end of the last century was a period rich in new material available with the
research of Barro (1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992) and Mankiw et al (1992). For
example, Mankiw et al (1992) introduced a new contribution in terms of empirics’
analysis to this theory.
Recently, papers like Acemoglu (2002), Atkinson et al (2011) and Chu and
Cozzi (2014) consolidate the existent literature with some improvements in their
researches.
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2.3 Integration and critical analysis of the different contri-
butions to the literature
This dissertation aims to explore exhaustively the combined field of endogenous
growth and monetary economics.
According to Bordo (2007), monetary policy is the major support for govern-
ments, through the action of central banks, to control the economies of the nations.
To pursue this goal, policy makers have two main instruments able to influence the
macroeconomic behavior of a country: (a) changes in interest rates (mainly short-
term variations); and (b) changes in monetary base. Bordo (2007) argues that these
instruments are critical to central banks achieve targets as low inflation or sustained
increases in output.
Regarding the thematic of monetary policy, it is important to discuss a specific
related topic, which is money neutrality. Patinkin (1987) defines money neutrality
as a quantity-theory proposition that, in the long-run, only the level of prices in an
economy changes with variations of the supply of money and not the level of real
output, such as real wages and employment. Which according to this theory, are not
affected by the quantity of money in circulation. In the literature there are several
different perspectives relatively to money neutrality, some accepting the theory and
others refuting it. Some examples of articles supporting money neutrality are Serletis
and Krause (1996) and Bae et al (2005), whereas some refusing the argument are
Bertocco (2007) and Pasten and Schoenle (2016).
Regarding the relationship between monetary policy and wage dispersion, ac-
cording to Ahrens and Snower (2014). Under the presence of Calvo nominal wage
contracts, a higher level of wage dispersion is caused by a higher level of inflation.
This situation of higher inequality between workers will cause envy (for the workers
that have lower incomes) and guilt (for the employees that receive higher wages).
These different experiences have opposite impacts on aggregate economy, since that
if the envy effect is bigger than guilt effect, an increase on inflation is associated to
an augment of employment and output, not allowing a vertically long-run Phillips
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curve.
Another perspective relatively to this subject is the one proposed by Thomas
(2008). This author analyses the optimal monetary policy in the context of a New
Keynesian model and within a searching and matching framework. The main con-
clusions of Thomas (2008) are as follows: (a) if the economy is on an efficient steady
state equilibrium and all hiring wages are identical, inflation should be zero to have
an optimal equilibrium; and (b) if the bargaining of the nominal wages creates dif-
ferences between workers (which according to Thomas (2008), corresponds to a more
realistic scenario), there will be price instability, which should be mitigated with a
controlled monetary policy of price inflation to guarantee that wage dispersion is
not too excessive.
Chu and Cozzi (2014) studies the effects of monetary policy on economic growth
within a Schumpeterian growth model featuring cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints
on consumption and R&D. After the development of the model, Chu and Cozzi
(2014) reaches to some conclusions regarding CIA constraints, namely that: (a) if
there are CIA constraints on consumption and R&D, an increase in the nominal
interest rate would decrease R&D investment and economic growth; and (b) if the
effect of CIA constraint on R&D dominates the CIA constraint on consumption,
the nominal interest rate generates negative impacts on R&D and economic growth.
These authors also discussed the optimality and suboptimality of the Friedman rule
(hypothetical zero or near-zero nominal interest rate) and how that monetary policy
influences the investment of economies on R&D.
According to Burdett and Mortensen (1998), wage dispersion occurs due to the
different characteristics of the labor force since workers can be employed or unem-
ployed and that situation changes the value of the necessary compensation that firms
need to give to workers. These authors argue that if an individual is employed, the
wage required for him to switch from on job to another is higher than the required
wage by other individuals who are unemployed. The rationale behind this theory
is that unemployed workers are willing to accept a lower wage to enter the market
and the ones that are already employed demand a higher compensation to change
their professional occupation. If we consider that these two types of workers have
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similar skills to execute a job, according to Burdett and Mortensen (1998), we can
observe the phenomenon of wage dispersion.
Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) follows the theory developed by Burdett and
Mortensen (1998) and also discusses the on-the-job search as one factor for the
existence of wage dispersion, but with some improvements to their model. These
authors argue that search frictions are a source of inefficiency and that is why there
are wage differences between firms and wage dispersion between workers. A key
aspect in the research of these authors is the introduction of asymmetric information
between employers and employees. On one hand, both know the type of each other
(in the case of employees, if they are employed or not and in the case of employers, the
type of the firm). One the other hand, when a firm makes a proposal to a potential
worker, he may have alternative offers from other firms, so there is more bargaining
power between individuals and firms at the time of wage definition, allowing this
way, variations in the wage dispersion between identical workers.
According to Aghion and Howitt (1992), growth results exclusively from tech-
nological progress, which means that firms have incentives to invest in research to
innovate the production system. The concept of creative destruction was introduced
in a mathematical model by these authors and, in a simply way, it suggests that if
firms are innovative enough, they will benefit from monopolistic rents until the next
innovation is introduced in the market.
Regarding the connection between economic growth and wage dispersion, Carre´
and Drouot (2004) argues that with improvements in the technology, workers must
be able to adapt to new productive realities, leading to a situation of “on-the-job
learning”, in which workers must adapt to the technological progress present in the
economy. According to Carre´ and Drouot (2004), this learning effect can smooth
the dispersion in wages as well as to offset the concept of creative destruction, once
that less skilled workers can learn on-the-job, so they are not affected by the pace
of technological change that could drag them to an unemployment situation.
Acemoglu (2002) supports the idea that there are two forces affecting the equi-
librium bias of technology, the price effect and the market size effect. To achieve this
results, Acemoglu (2002) studies the influence of the direction of technical change
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on the equilibrium bias of technology and the result is that price effect and market
size effect are substitutes, so it is the elasticity of substitution between the factors
the key to understand the power of the effects. Acemoglu (2002) also presents the
innovation possibilities frontier as determinant of equilibrium bias of technology.
Contrarily to Acemoglu (2002), Afonso (2006) eliminates the market size and
scale effects, and argues that the rise of skill premium can be explained through a
combination between the price channel effect and what he called as the technological-
knowledge-absorption effect. Afonso (2006) supports the idea that technological-
knowledge progress is influenced by the stock of skilled workers and that stock of
qualified workers will determine the technological-knowledge bias. Afonso (2006)
argues that if the amount of skilled labor available increase, there is an expansion
in the technological-knowledge-absorption effect, creating conditions for the R&D
to be redirected to improve intermediate goods, reducing this way the final price of
goods for the existent technology.
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3 Model
In the following section, we introduce, describe, and analyze an endogenous
growth model with cash-in-advance (CIA) constraints on R&D and two types of
workers: low and high-skilled.
As a baseline, we closely follow Chu and Cozzi (2014) approach but we allow for
two types of workers, i.e., high and low-skilled workers (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
2004).
As in the standard R&D literature, our model have three different sectors: final
good sector, intermediate sector and R&D sector. The low-skilled workers can only
participate on the final and intermediate good sectors, whereas the high-skilled
workers can only work on the final good and R&D sectors.
3.1 The final good sector
Following Afonso (2016), the final good sector produce an homogeneous good,
in a perfect competition scenario, which production function at time t is given by:
yt =
1
1− α− βL
α
y,t (γHy,t)
β
(∫ 1
0
xt (j)
1−α−β dj
)
, (1)
Where xt(j) denotes intermediate goods j ∈ [0, 1],and Hy,t and Ly,t corresponds
to the high-skilled and low-skilled labor, respectively, used in the final goods produc-
tion. Since that there are two types of workers in the final good sector, firms must
adjust their labor force by hiring low skilled workers Ly ≤ L and high skilled workers
Hy ≤ H. Note that, although both of the skilled types are required, their obligations
are different: while low skilled workers only execute straightforward tasks, the high
skilled must perform more demanding ones. Furthermore, by allowing γ ≥ 1, we
imply that there is a difference in the productivity of workers, this is, the high skill
labor is, in absolute terms, more productive that the low skill labor. To produce the
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final good, firms apply jth types of non-durable intermediate goods Xj. Moreover,
α , β and 1 − α − β represent, respectively, the shares of unskilled labor, skilled
labor and intermediate goods. In equilibrium, the skill premium, i.e., the relative
wage of skilled over unskilled labor, is greater than one.
From profit maximization, the demand function for xt (j), Hy,t and Ly,t are,
respectively:
xt (j) =
(
1
pt (j)
) 1
α+β [
Lαy,t (γHy,t)
β
] 1
α+β
, (2)
wh,t =
β
1− α− βL
α
y,t (γHy,t)
β−1 (γ)
(∫ 1
0
xt (j)
1−α−β dj
)
(3)
wl,t =
α
1− α− βL
α−1
y,t (γHy,t)
β
(∫ 1
0
xt (j)
1−α−β dj
)
(4)
where pt(j) is the price of xt (j), wh,t is the wage for high-skilled workers, and
wl,t for low-skilled workers.
3.2 The intermediate good sector
In the final good sector we have multiple identical firms producing a homoge-
neous product under perfect competition, using jth types of intermediate goods. In
the intermediate sector there are symmetric firms, but contrary to the final good
sector, these firms produce differentiated intermediate goods. There is a firm tem-
porarily leading each industry until the arrival of the next innovation.Upon each new
innovation, the industry leader is surrogate by the firm owning the new innovation.
The production function for the industry leader j at time t is:
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xt(j) = Z
qt(j)Ly,t(j) (5)
The parameter z (z > 1) measures the step size of a productivity improvement,
qt(j) is the number of improvements that took place in industry j at time t and
Lx,t(j) is product0ion low skill labor on industry j. Following Chu and Cozzi (2014)
and Peretto (1998), MCt(j) =
wl,t
zqj(t)
, i.e., we follow a cost-reducing perspective of
vertical innovation, for a given Zqt(j).
As firms compete on prices, if we follow the Bertrand price competition approach,
the price that maximizes the profit of the firm will be a markup µ = pt(j)/MCt(j)
over the marginal cost. For the purpose of our model, we will assume that the
markup µ > 1 is a policy instrument defined by the patent authority who regulates
the sector (Chu and Cozzi, 2014). Therefore the amount of monopolistic profit is
defined as:
Πt (j) = pt (j)xt (j)− wL,tLx,t (6)
Following Neto et al (2017) and Acemoglu (2002), we normalize the prices to
unity, i.e., ptj = 1. Hence:
Πt(j) =
(
µ− 1
µ
)
pt(j)Xt(j) =
(
µ− 1
µ
)
G, (7)
for matters of simplicity, lets consider that G =
[
Lαy,t (γHy,t)
β
] 1
α+β
.
Finally, we can conclude that production-labor income is:
wL,tLx,t =
1
µ
pt (j)xt (j) =
1
µ
G (8)
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3.3 R&D Sector
The value of the monopolistic firm in industry j is symbolized by vt(j). If we
assume that there is a symmetric equilibrium between industries, vt(j) will simply
be vt. For this reason, the familiar no-arbitrage condition for the value of the
monopolistic firm is:
rt =
pit + v˙t − λtvt
vt
(9)
With this equation, we state that the real interest rate rt is equal to the asset
return per unit of asset. That asset return is estimated by the sum of the monopolist
profit (pit), potential capital gain (v˙t) and expected capital loss due to creative
destruction (λtvt). λt is defined as the arrival rate of the next innovation.
Following Chu and Cozzi (2014), in our model, there is an unit continuum of
R&D firms indexed by k ∈ [0, 1], and we make two essential assumptions. The
first one is that only high skill labor Hr,t(k) works on this sector and the second
assumption is that R&D firms faces a CIA constraint and need to borrow money
from households, Bt(k), subject to the nominal interest rate to pay the entire wage
bill. Therefore, the total amount of money borrowed is Bt(k) = wt,H .Hr,t(k), and
the total cost of R&D per unit of time is (1 + it) [wt,HHr,t(k)].
If the interest rate fluctuates, it will influence the hiring decisions of the en-
trepreneurs, thus the monetary authority can affect the allocation equilibrium of
labor resources. The zero-expected-profit condition of firm k is give by:
vtλt (k) = (1 + it)wH,tHr,t (k) (10)
where λt(k) is the innovation arrival rate per unit of time t of firm k, that is given
by λt(k) = ϕ¯Hr,t(k), with ϕ¯ =
ϕ
Nt
capturing the dilution effect that removes the scale
effects as described in Lainez and Peretto (2006). If we combine the different arrival
rates of innovation from all the k firms in the sector, we will get the aggregate arrival
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rate of innovation as follows:
λt =
∫ 1
0
λt(k)∂k =
ϕHr,t
Nt
= ϕhr,t (11)
with hr,t ≡ Hr,tN as the R&D high skill labor per capita.
3.4 Households
At time t, the population size of each household is Nt, and its law of motion is
N˙t = nNt, where n ≥ 0 is the exogenous growth rate of the population. The utility
function of the identical households of the population is give by:
U =
∫ 1
0
e−ρt [lncu,t + θln (1− ut)] dt, (12)
where ut = ht, lt, i.e., high-skilled and low-skilled labor, cu,t is the consumption
of final goods per capita and ut is the supply of labor per capita at time t. The
parameters ρ > 0 and θ ≥ 0 measure subjective discounting and leisure preference,
respectively.
In order to maximize their utility function, households are subject to the next
asset-accumulation equation:
˙au,t + m˙t = (rt − n) au,t + wu,tut + τt − cu,t − (pit + n)mu,t + itbu,t (13)
Where au,t is the real value of assets owned by each member of households and rt
is the real interest rate. To earn a wage wu,t each household supplies labor ut. The
government obtains or gives a lump-sum transfer τt to households. The inflation
rate is given by pit and the real money balance that individuals retain is mu,t. bu,t is
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the amount of money lend by each household to the investors of R&D firms and it
is the interest rate associated to bu,t.
Applying standard dynamic optimization, we compute a no-arbitrage condition
given by it = rt + pit and, then we can infer that it also represents the nominal
interest rate.
The optimality conditions for consumption and labor supply are, respectively,
1
cu,t
= ηu,t (14)
wu,t (1− ut) = θcu,t (15)
For simplicity, we assume that there is an exogenous threshold such that ch,t = syt
and cl,t = (1− s) yt, with s > 0.5. Hence:
wh,t (1− ht) = θsyt (16)
wl,t (1− lt) = θ (1− s) yt (17)
The familiar inter-temporal optimality condition is:
− η˙t
ηt
= rt − ρ− n (18)
3.5 The monetary authority
The aim of this dissertation is to analyze the impact of the monetary policy
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on wage dispersion and economic growth and, therefore, the role of the monetary
authority is key to understand this same impact. Despite all the monetary policy
instruments that exist, we will only study the impact of exogenously changing the
nominal interest rate on wages at the equilibrium, in line with Chu and Cozzi (2014).
Hence, Mt stands for the nominal money supply and
M˙t
Mt
is the growth rate.
Assuming that the monetary authority set an exogenously it, then we can calculate
endogenously the inflation rate as pit = it − rt. Given pit, the growth rate of the
nominal money supply is endogenously given by M˙t
Mt
= m˙t
mt
+pit+n. Finally, households
receive a lump transfer τtNt =
M˙t
Pt
= ˙(mt + [pi + n]mt)Nt due to seigniorage revenue
from the monetary authority.
3.6 Decentralized equilibrium
The equilibrium is a combination of allocations and prices, namely a time path
of allocations {cl,t, ch,t,ml,t,mh,t, lx,t, ly,t, hy,t, hr,t, yt, xt(j), Lt(j), Ht(k)} and a time
path of prices {pt(j), wl,t, wh,t, rt, it, vt}
Additionally, at time t,
 households maximize utility assuming {wl,t, wh,t, rt, it};
 competitive final-good firms maximize their profit by producing yt and taking
{px,t(j), wl,t, wh,t} as given;
 in the intermediate good sector, as firms have market power, they choose to
produce {xt(j)}, to hire {Lx,t(j)} and sell the goods at {pt(j)} to maximize
profit, assuming {wl,t} as given;
 R&D firms maximize expect profit by employing {Hr,t(k)}, taking {wh,t, it, vt}
as given;
 the market clearing condition for low-skilled labor is given by Lx,t +Ly,t = Lt;
 the market clearing condition for high-skilled labor is given by Hr,t+Hy,t = Ht;
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 the market clearing condition for final good sector holds that yt = (cl,t+ch,t)Nt;
 the value of the assets of households increases with the value of monopolistic
firms such that vt = au,tNt;
 R&D entrepreneurs borrow money from households and the total amount holds
such that wh,tHr,t = bu,tNt
Substituting (5) into (1), we find the aggregate production function:
yt =
1
1− α− βZ
1−α−β
t L
1−α−β
x,t L
α
y,t (γHy,t)
β , (19)
where aggregate technology Zt is defined as:
Zt = exp(
∫ 1
0
qt(j)djlnz) (20)
Following Chu and Cozzi (2014), after some mathematical manipulations, the
growth rate of aggregate technology is given by:
gt = λtln(z) = ϕln(z)hr,t (21)
It is possible to prove that given a constant nominal interest rate i, the economy
immediately jumps to a unique and saddle point stable balanced growth path along
which each variable grows at a constant rate, in line with Chu and Cozzi (2014).
Following the previous paragraph, we know that labor allocations are stationary
under the balanced growth path. Imposing balanced growth on 9, we set vt =
Πt
ρ+λ
,
taking into account that p˙i
pi
= g + n and r = g + p + n, from (18). Hence, following
Chu and Cozzi (2014), combining the next four equations we get:
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
vt =
Πt
ρ+λ
vtλt (k) = (1 + it)wh,tHr,t (k)
λ = ϕhr,t
Πt = (
µ−1
µ
)
[
Lαy,t (γHy,t)
β
] 1
α+β
(
µ− 1
µ
)(1− α− β)hy = (1 + i)β( ρ
ϕ
+ hr) (22)
This corresponds to the first of three equations to obtain the allocation if high-
skilled workers. To get the second one needs to substitute (3) on (16) to obtain:
β(1− h) = θshy (23)
Finally, the last equation will be the market clearing for high-skilled labor, as:
h = hr + hy (24)
Solving (22) - (24), we find the equilibrium for high skill labor allocations:
hy =
(1 + i)β
[(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β) + (1 + i)(θs+ β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1) (25)
hr =
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β) + (1 + i)(θs+ β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
(26)
h =
(1 + i)β + (µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β) + (1 + i)(θs+ β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
(27)
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Equation (26) gives insights of how R&D labor is affected by the nominal interest
rate since an increase of i leads to a decrease in hr under both elastic and inelastic
labor supply. Moreover, the economic growth g, which is defined by g = ϕln(z)hr,
is also decreasing in the nominal interest rate. Note that, substituting hr on g, we
get g = [
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)(ρ+ϕ)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)] − ρ]ln(z) and
∂g
∂i
< 0. Chu and Lai (2013) already
support the idea that i have a negative impact on g through the inflation rate, i.e.,
the authors defend that there is a negative relationship between R&D and inflation.
As in Chu and Cozzi (2014), pi = i− r = i− g(i)− ρ− n, so with an increase on i,
pi also increases, as opposed to hr and g that decreases under these circumstances.
PROPOSITION 1 R&D and economic growth both decrease with an increase of
the nominal interest rate.
Regarding low-skilled labor, it is interesting to note that, due to the definition
of the model, its allocation across sectors will not depend in the nominal interest
rate.
Hence, following a similar approach, combining (4) with (8):
αµlx = (1− α− β)ly (28)
and (4) with (17), we get:
α (1− l) = θ (1− s) ly (29)
Finally, the market clearing condition for low-skilled labor is:
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l = lx + ly (30)
Solving (28)-(30), we obtain the equilibrium allocations for low-skilled labor:
lx =
(1− α− β)
θµ (1− s) + (1− α− β) + αµ (31)
ly =
αµ
θµ (1− s) + (1− α− β) + αµ (32)
l =
(1− α− β) + αµ
θµ (1− s) + (1− α− β) + αµ (33)
3.7 Socially Optimal allocation
Following Chu and Cozzi (2014), it is possible to derive the socially optimal
allocations of the model. Imposing balanced growth on (12), yields:
U =
1
ρ
[
lnc0 +
g
ρ
+ ln (1− lu)
]
, (34)
where C0 =
1
1−α−βz
1−α−β
0 l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
βl1−α−βx , g = (ϕlnz)hr and the exogenous z0 is
normalized to unity.
Maximizing the previous equation subject to l = ly + lx and to h = hy + hr, we
get the first best allocations, denoted with a subscript *:
h∗r = 1−
(θ + β)ρ
(ϕlnz)
(35)
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h∗y =
ρβ
(ϕlnz)
(36)
h∗ = 1− θρ
(ϕlnz)
(37)
l∗y =
α
(1 + θ − β) (38)
l∗x =
1− β − α
1 + θ − β (39)
l∗ =
1− β
1 + θ − β (40)
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4 Optimal Monetary Policy and Friedman Rule
In this section we provide a detailed analysis regarding the optimal nominal
interest rate. As stated in the previous section, taking into account that only high-
skilled labor is directly affected by the nominal interest rate, the identification on
the optimal monetary policy will only take into account hy, hr, and h. Nevertheless,
note that the relative allocations of labor and the respective wage dispersion will be
affected by the optimal interest rate.
We first analyze the case of inelastic labor supply (section 4.1); and, then, we
study the general scenario of elastic labor supply (section 4.2). Note that, as in
Chu and Cozzi (2014) and Neto et al (2017), it is possible to study where (a) the
optimal interest rate enables the first best socially optimal allocations, and (b)
R&D overinvestment or underinvestment is a necessary and sufficient condition for
the Friedman rule to be suboptimal. Nevertheless, for simplicity, we will not focus
our analysis on these two topics, but rather on the simulations and the respective
wage dispersion, once the optimal monetary policy is defined.
4.1 Friedman Rule under Inelastic Labor Supply
Under inelastic labor supply (θ = 0), the equilibrium allocations simplifies to:
hy =
(1 + i)β
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β) + (1 + i)β (
ρ
ϕ
+ 1) (41)
hr =
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β) + (1 + i)β (
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
(42)
As θ = 0, h = 1. Just by evaluating the equations (41) and (42), it is clear that
an increase in the nominal interest rate prompts a decrease (increase) in the R&D
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(final good) high-skilled labor hr (hy). Thus, i can be seen as a CIA constraint on
R&D investment since an increase in i raises R&D costs, which drives a transfer of
high-skilled labor from the R&D to the final good sector.
Under inelastic labor supply, by choosing the optimal interest rate i∗, the mone-
tary authority may be able to achieve the first best allocations {h∗r, h∗y}, as follows:
i∗ = max[
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)− [(1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz − β]
(1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz − β , 0] (43)
We impose i∗ > 0 to respect the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate.
Following Chu and Cozzi (2014), it is possible to infer (or suspect) that if i∗ = 0,
then Friedman rule is found to be optimal, nevertheless the monetary authority is
unable to match the first-best allocations. In the case of i∗ > 0, the Friedman rule
is suboptimal, nonetheless the monetary authority is able to reach the first-best
allocations assuming that i = i∗. This will be analyzed in the next section.2
Overinvestment in R&D is a necessary and sufficient condition for the Friedman
rule to be suboptimal, well as whether a positive i∗ leads to the first-best labor
allocations.
Regarding the several variables that influence i∗(when i∗ > 0), we can infer that
an increase in µ, leads to an increase in the optimal interest rate. Intuitively, follow-
ing Chu and Cozzi (2014), a higher µ implies a larger protection of an innovation,
leading to a higher probability of overinvestment in R&D. Additionally, i∗ is also
increasing in ρ, because if the discount rate is higher, the probability of overin-
vestment in R&D is larger. On the other hand, i∗ is decreasing in ϕ and z, since
that when the R&D productivity ϕ or the step size z of innovation is larger, for
the same economic growth rate, we need less R&D workers, hence the probability
of underinvestment is higher. One of the differences of our model when compared
with Chu and Cozzi (2014) is that we allow the participation of workers (high- and
low-skilled) in the production function. Interestingly, i∗ > 0 is decreasing in α and
2Indeed, making a comparison between (42) and (45) under θ = 0, it is possible to check whether
mathematically.
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β. One explanation might be that the more workers needed in the final good sector,
the more likely underinvestment is to occur.
4.2 Friedman Rule under Elastic Labor Supply
Following a similar approach as in the previous section, we can derive the optimal
nominal interest rate under elastic labor supply as:
i∗ = max[
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)− Ω
Ω
, 0], (44)
with Ω as a parameter for the following condition:.
Ω =
(θs+ β)
(β + θ)
(1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz − θs− β (45)
Note that, in this case, i has a distortionary effect on the consumption-leisure
decision. Hence, it is possible to infer that, following Chu and Cozzi (2014), i∗ can
no longer achieve the first-best allocations.
From (43), we can prove that h∗r > 0 is sufficient to ensure that Ω > 1.
Following, once again, Chu and Cozzi (2014), we can infer that (µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β) >
Ω implies R&D overinvestment. Furthermore, note that the comparative statistics
from the previous section apply.
In the next section, we numerically simulate in detail the dynamics and main
implications of i
∗
.
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5 Simulations
This section closely follows the methodology proposed by Chu and Cozzi (2014).
We provide a numerical simulation on the optimality of the Friedman rule, under
both inelastic and elastic labor supply. To provide the results available below, we
need to identify the following set of parameters {ρ, z, µ, ϕ, θ, iLR, β, α, s, h}.
iLR defines the nominal interest rate in the long run, which is set to 0.08, in line with
Chu and Cozzi (2014). Considering Acemoglu and Akcigit (2012), we set the step
size of innovation z to 1.02 and the discount rate ρ to 0.05. For the markup µ, we
follow Neto et al (2017) and Reis and Sequeira (2007) to set µ = 2, a slightly higher
value thank Chu and Cozzi (2014). For the other set of parameters {β, α, s, h},
we have established β > α, which means that the share of high-skilled workers is
bigger than the share of low-skilled workers in the final good sector, in line with the
average values reported by Afonso (2016), based on OECD statistics. s = 0.5, i.e.,
it is assumed that the consumption of goods is equal for both types of workers, and
ϕ = 1.2.
In line with Chu and Cozzi (2014), we fix g = 0.02, corresponding to the long-run
economic growth rate of the United States. Nevertheless, it is important to consider
the argument that R&D might not be the only source of economic growth (Comin,
2004). Hence, we consider several other possible lower economic growth rates, based
on this idea that R&D investments can only explain a fraction, f , of the long-run
economic growth rate. Taking into account that f corresponds to a lower growth
rate, we can extend our analysis to different levels of growth.
Finally, regarding θ, we set it in a way to match a standard moment of h = 0.33.
Table 1 summarizes the values for each parameter:
Table 1: Baseline Parameters
ρ z µ g iLR α β s h
0.05 1.02 2 0.02 0.08 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.3
3h = 0.3 can be seen as high-skilled workers working one third of the day.
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The simulation results under inelastic and elastic labor supply are reported in
table 2 and table 3. It is interesting to note that the Friedman rule is optimal for
almost all of the considered scenarios, i.e., it seems that there is no room for the
monetary authority to improve social welfare. Nevertheless, there is a particular
case where the Friedman rule is not optimal: it corresponds to the lowest growth
rate scenario considered (g = 0.60%). In other words, an i∗ > 0 is actually socially
desired if the growth rate is below a particular level.
By analyzing the allocation of the high-skilled labor, it is possible to conclude
that hr(under i
∗ > 0) < hr(under i∗ = 0). The mechanism behind can be explained
as follows: under a low economic growth rate, setting i∗ = 0 leads to an overinvest-
ment in R&D (through the allocation of high-skilled labor) in terms of social welfare.
Hence, setting i∗ > 0 (in this case, i∗ = 0.05) leads to a reallocation of high-skilled
labor between the two sectors, which connects to the overinvestment phenomenon.
Additionally, by analyzing and comparing hr(under i
∗ > 0), hr(under i∗ = 0), and
the optimal, h∗r, we can see that, as expected in section 4.1, i
∗ > 0 (in this case un-
der study, i∗ = 0.05), can achieve the first best optimal allocation of labor. Hence,
hr(under i
∗ > 0) = h∗r < hr(under i
∗ = 0). 4
Finally, regarding wage dispersion, by comparing its values under i∗ > 0 and
i∗ = 0, we can conclude that applying the Friedman rule (and not i∗ = 0.08)
contributes to an increase in the wage dispersion. This result states that, below a
specific economic threshold, wage dispersion can be reduced by setting i∗ = 0. In
this case, we go from a wage ratio 1.800 to 1.781.
Table 2: Inelastic Labor Supply
f 1 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3
g 2,00% 1,80% 1,60% 1,40% 1,20% 1,00% 0,80% 0,60%
ϕ 4,83 4,36 3,90 3,43 2,97 2,50 2,04 1,57
i* 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,05
Wh
Wl
5,461 4,935 4,409 3,884 3,358 2,832 2,307 1,781
4In this case, 0.198 < 0.2063;
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Table 3: Elastic Labor Supply
f 1 0,9 0,8 0,7 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,3
g 2,00% 1,80% 1,60% 1,40% 1,20% 1,00% 0,80% 0,60%
ϕ 16,09 14,54 12,99 11,44 9,89 8,34 6,79 5,25
θ 2,95 2,95 2,94 2,94 2,93 2,92 2,91 2,89
i* 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
Wh
Wl
1,161 1,160 1,160 1,160 1,159 1,159 1,158 1,156
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6 Conclusions
In this thesis we have developed an endogenous growth model with cash-in-
advance (CIA) constraints in R&D to study the impacts of monetary policy on
wage dispersion and labor allocation.
Section 2 provided an in-depth literature review on the topic. We concluded that,
to the best of our knowledge, there was no theoretical study dealing specifically with
the relationship between monetary policy and wage dispersion, under an endogenous
growth model with CIA in R&D.
Section 3 presented the theoretical model, following the contributions of Chu and
Cozzi (2014). We introduced two types of workers into the model: (a) high-skilled
workers who can be employed in the final and R&D sectors; and (b) low-skilled
workers who can be employed in the final and intermediate good sectors. A monetary
authority was introduced aiming to maximize welfare by setting the optimal nominal
interest rate. This allowed us to study not only the impact on monetary policy on
wage dispersion but also to test the optimality of the Friedman rule (i.e., whether
optimal nominal interest rate should be zero). Hence, from the theoretical model,
the main conclusions are the following. First, under inelastic labor supply, Friedman
rule might not be optimal for low economic growth rates. Furthermore, a positive
but low interest rate can contribute to a lower wage dispersion between high- and
low-skilled workers. Second, under elastic labor supply, Friedman rule seems to be
optimal for all the considered scenarios. Therefore, it is possible to infer that: (i)
a common monetary policy among several countries, as the Eurozone, might not be
optimal for all types of countries, based on their economic growth rates; (ii) a correct
setting of the nominal interest rate might contribute to lower the wage dispersion
between high- and low-skilled workers.
Finally, as future work, it would be interesting to extend this analysis by in-
troducing trade unions and their role of bargaining low-skilled wages to study the
interdependency between labor market policies and monetary policy.
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7 Appendix
7.1. Final good sector
We consider production output function:
yt =
1
1−α−βL
α
y,t(γHy,t)
β(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−x−β∂j) (1)
From profit maximization we get:
∂Yt
∂xt(j)
= 0 ⇐⇒[
1
1−α−β .L
α
y,t(γHy,t)
β
] [∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j
]′
= 0⇐⇒[
1
1−α−β .L
α
y,t(γHy,t)
β
]′
.
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j+
[
1
1−α−β .L
α
y,t(γHy,t)
β
]
.
[∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂y
]′
=
0 ⇐⇒[
1
1−α−β .L
α
y,t(γHy,t)
β
]
.
[
x1−α−βt
]′
= 0 ⇐⇒
1
1−α−β .L
α
y,t(γHy,t)
β.(1− α− β)x−α−βt = 0 ⇐⇒
Lαy (γHy)
β.x−α−βt = 0
pi = Pt.yt − Pt(j).Xt(j) ⇐⇒
pi = Pt.
[
1
1−α−β .L
α
y,t(γHy,t)
β(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j)
]
− pt(j).xt(j)
∂pi
∂xt
= 0 ⇐⇒
pt.L
α
y (γHy)
β.Xt(j)
−α−β − pt(j) = 0 ⇐⇒
pt.L
α
y (γHy)
β.Xt(j)
−α−β = pt(j) ⇐⇒
xt(j)
−α−β = pt(j)
pt.Lαy (γHy)
β ⇐⇒
xt(j)
α+β = 1
pt(j)
.ptL
α
y (γHy)
β
Assuming Pt = 1,
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xt(j) = (
1
pt(j)
)
1
α+β .
[
Lαy (γHy)
β
] 1
α+β ,considering G =
[
Lαy (γHy)
β
] 1
α+β
⇐⇒ xt = ( 1pt(j))
1
α+β .G (2)
To get the wages of the final good sector, we must derivate ytin order to labor:
∂yt
∂Hy
= wh ⇐⇒
wh,t =
[
1
1−α−β .L
α
y,t(γHy,t)
β(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j)
]′
⇐⇒
wh,t =
[
β
1−α−β .L
α
y,t(γHy,t)
β−1.γ(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j)
]
⇐⇒
wh,t =
[
β
1−α−β .L
α
y,t
(γHy,t)β
γ.Hy,t
.γ(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j)
]
If G =
[
Lαy,t(γHy,t)
β
] 1
α+β ,then Lαy,t.(γHy,t)
β = Gα+β,so:
wh,t =
β
1−α−β .
Gα+β
Hy,t
(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j) (3)
And, therefore:
wh,t =
α
1−α−β .
Gα+β
Ly,t
(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j) (4)
7.2. Intermediate good sector
xt(j) = Z
qt(j).Ly,t(j) (5)
z: step of productivity improvement;
q : # of improvements that have occurred in industry j at time t;
Lx,t(j) : production labor/low skill labor on industry j.
Following Perreto (1998), MCt(j) =
Wt
zqj(t)
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Markup: µ = pt(j)
MCt(j)
Notice that
pit(j) =
(
µ−1
µ
)
.pt(j).Xt(j) ⇐⇒
pit(j) = (
µ
µ
).pt(j).xt(j)− ( 1µ).pt(j).xt(j)⇐⇒
pit(j) = pt(j).xt(j)− ( 1µ).pt(j).xt(j)⇐⇒
pit(j) = pt(j).xt(j)− wl.Lx,t(j) (6)
Πt(j) =
(
µ−1
µ
)
.pt(j).Xt(j) =
(
µ−1
µ
)
G (7)
The production-labor income is:
wL,tLx,t =
1
µ
pt (j)xt (j) =
1
µ
.G (8)
7.3. R&D sector
rt =
pit+v˙t−λt.vt
vt
(9)
Two assumptions:
. R&D borrows money to pay wages
. only skilled workers work in the R&D sector
Total amount of money borrowed: Bt(k) = αwt,H .Hr,t(k)
Total amount of money borrowed plus interest: Bt(k)(1+i) = [αwt,H .Hv,t(k)] (1+
i)
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Since that R&D firms borrow money, the zero-expected-profit condition:
vtλt (k) = (1 + it)wH,tHr,t (k) (10)
Considering that the firm-level innovation arrival rate per unit of time is λt(k) =
¯ϕ.Hr,t(k),
where ϕ¯ = ϕ
w
captures the dillution effect that removes the scale effects, we will
have that:
λt =
∫ 1
0
λt(k)∂k =
ϕ.Hr,t
Nt
= ϕ.hr,t (11)
7.4. Households
We have the utility function for households:
U =
∫ 1
0
e−ρt [ln cu,t + θ ln (1− ut)] dt, (12)
And we have the restriction to maximize the utility respecting the asset-accumulation
equation:
a˙t + m˙t = (rt − n) at + wu,tut + τt − cu,t − (pit + n)mt + itbt (13)
Max HamCut ,Lut = U+ηt [a˙t + m˙t − [(rt − n) at + wu,tut + τt − cu,t − (pit + n)mt + itbt]]
Note:∫ 1
0
e−ρt [ln cu,t + θ ln (1− ut)] dt =
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[e−ρt [ln cu,t + θ ln (1− ut)]]10=
e−ρt [ln cu + θ ln (1− u)]− [e−ρ.0 [ln cu + θ ln (1− ut)]]=
0− [1. [ln cu + θ ln (1− u)]]=
− [ln cu + θ ln (1− u)]
∂Ham
∂Cu
= 0 ⇐⇒
− [ln cu + θ ln (1− u)]′+[ηt [a˙t + m˙t − [(rt − n) at + wu,tut + τt − cu,t − (pit + n)mt + itbt]]]′ ⇐⇒
− 1
Cu
+ ηu,t ⇐⇒
1
Cu
= ηu,t (14)
If Ut = hz, then
1
Cu
= ηu,t ⇐⇒ 1CH = ηH,t
If Ut = ll, then
1
Cu
= ηu,t ⇐⇒ 1CL = ηL,t
∂Ham
∂lU
= 0 ⇐⇒
− [ln cu + θ ln (1− lu)]′+[ηt [a˙t + m˙t − [(rt − n) at + wu,tut + τt − cu,t − (pit + n)mt + itbt]]] =
0⇐⇒
−
[
θ. −1
1−lu
]
− ηu,t.wu,t = 0⇐⇒
θ
1−lu = ηu,t.wu,t
As 1
Cu,t
= ηu,t, then:
θ
1−lu =
1
Cu,t
.wu,t(=) wu,t(1− lu) = θ.Cu,t (15)
. If ut = ht,wh,t(1− ht) = θ.Ch,t
. If ut = l,wl,t(1− lt) = θ.Cl,t
We assume that there is a threshold exogenously to the model such that ch,t = syt
and cl,t = (1− s) yt, with s > 0.5. Hence:
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wh,t (1− ht) = θsyt (16)
wl,t (1− lt) = θ (1− s) yt (17)
The familiar intertemporal optimality condition is:
− η˙t
ηt
= rt − ρ− n (18)
7.5. Decentralized Equilibrium
Substituting (5) into (1), we find the aggregate production function:
yt =
1
1− α− βZ
1−α−β
t L
1−α−β
x,t L
α
y,t (γHy,t)
β , (19)
where aggregate technology Zt is defined as:
Zt = exp(
∫ 1
0
qt(j)djlnz) (20)
Growth rate of aggregate technology is given by:
gt = λtln(z) = ϕln(z)hr,t (21)
Imposing balanced growth for high skill labor, yields that:
-If we substitute (3) on (9), we have:
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vtλt(k) = (1 + it)[
β
1−α−β .
Gα+β
Hy,t
(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j)]Hr,t(k)
We also know that vt =
Πt
ρ+λ
,Πt = (
µ−1
µ
)G, λ = ϕ.hr,t(k), therefore:
Πt
ρ+λ
λt(k) = (1 + it)[
β
1−α−β .
Gα+β
Hy,t
(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j)]Hr,t(k)⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)G
ρ+ϕ.hr,t(k)
ϕ.hr,t(k) = (1 + it)[
β
1−α−β .
Gα+β
N.hy,t
(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j)]N.hr,t(k)⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)G
ρ+ϕ.hr,t(k)
ϕ = (1 + it)[
β
1−α−β .
Gα+β
hy,t
(G)1−α−β]⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)G
ρ+ϕ.hr,t(k)
ϕ = (1 + it)[
β
1−α−β .
G
hy,t
]⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)ϕ(1− α− β)hy = (1 + it)β(ρ+ ϕhr)⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)hy = (1 + it)β( ρϕ + hr) (22)
To obtain the second equation, we have to substitute (3) on (16):
wh,t =
β
1−α−β .
Gα+β
Hy,t
(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j) (3)
:
wh,t (1− ht) = θsyt (16)
[ β
1−α−β .
Gα+β
hy,t
(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j)](1− h) = θsyt ⇐⇒
[ β
1−α−β .
Gα+β
hy,t
(G)1−α−β](1− h) = θsyt ⇐⇒
[ βG
(1−α−β)hy,t ](1− h) = θsyt ⇐⇒
If G =
[
Lαy,t(γHy,t)
β
] 1
α+β ,then Lαy,t.(γHy,t)
β = Gα+β,
so yt =
1
1−α−βL
α
y,t (γHy,t)
β
(∫ 1
0
xt (j)
1−α−β dj
)
⇐⇒ yt = 11−α−βGα+βG1−α−β ⇐⇒
yt =
G
1−α−β , therefore:
[ βG
(1−α−β)hy,t ](1− h) = θs
G
1−α−β ⇐⇒ βhy (1− h) =θs ⇐⇒ β(1− h) = θshy (23)
Finally, the last equation will be the market clearing for high skill labor, so:
h = hr + hy (24)
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Solving (22) - (24), we will find the equilibrium for high skill labor allocations:

(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)hy = (1 + it)β( ρϕ + hr)
β(1− h) = θshy ⇐⇒
h = hr + hy
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)hy = (1 + it)β( ρϕ + 1− θsβ hy − hy)
h = 1− θs
β
hy ⇐⇒
1− θs
β
hy − hy = h
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)hy = (1 + it)β( ρϕ + 1− θsβ hy − hy)
−−−−− ⇐⇒
−−−−−
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)hy = (1 + it)β( ρϕ + 1)− (1 + it)β( θsβ + 1)hy
−−−−− ⇐⇒
−−−−−
[(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β) + (1 + it)β( θsβ + 1)]hy = (1 + it)β( ρϕ + 1)
−−−−− ⇐⇒
−−−−−
hy =
(1+it)β
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1) (25)
−−−−−
−−−−−
Notice that, hrwill be:
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β)hy = (1 + it)β( ρϕ + hr)⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1− α− β) (1+it)β
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1) = (1 + it)β(
ρ
ϕ
+ hr)⇐⇒
hr =
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
(26)
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Finally, h will be:
h = hr + hy ⇐⇒
h =
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
+ (1+it)β
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)⇐⇒
h =
(1+it)β+(
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
(27)
Imposing balanced growth for low skill labor, yields that:
We already know that:
wl,t = [
α
1−α−β .
Gα+β
Ly,t
(
∫ 1
0
xt(j)
1−α−β∂j)] ⇐⇒ wl,t = [ α1−α−β G
α+β
Ly,t
(G)1−α−β] ⇐⇒
wl,t =
α
1−α−β .
G
Ly,t
If we consider Pt(j) = 1 and Xt(j) = G, therefore:
wl,tLx =
1
µ
G⇐⇒
α
1−α−β .
G
Ly,t
Lx =
1
µ
G⇐⇒
α
1−α−β .
1
ly,t
lx =
1
µ
⇐⇒
αµlx = (1− α− β)ly,t (28)
Similar to high skill calculations, we know that:
wh,t =
α
1−α−β .
G
ly,t
and yt =
G
1−α−β
α
1−α−β .
G
ly,t
(1− lt) = θ (1− s) G1−α−β ⇐⇒
α
ly,t
(1− lt) = θ (1− s)⇐⇒
α (1− lt) = θ (1− s) ly,t (29)
The market Clearing for low skill labor will be:
39
l = lx + ly (30)
Solving (28)-(30), we will obtain the equilibrium for low skill labor:

αµlx = (1− α− β)ly,t
l = lx + ly ⇐⇒
α (1− lt) = θ (1− s) ly,t
lx =
(1−α−β)
αµ
ly,t
l = ( (1−α−β)
αµ
+ 1)ly ⇐⇒
α
(
1− ( (1−α−β)
αµ
+ 1)ly
)
= θ (1− s) ly,t
−−−−−
−−−−− ⇐⇒
α− (1−α−β)
µ
ly − αly = θ (1− s) ly
−−−−−
−−−−− ⇐⇒
θ (1− s) ly + (1−α−β)µ ly + αly = α
−−−−−
−−−−− ⇐⇒
θµ (1− s) ly + (1− α− β)ly + αµly = αµ
−−−−−
−−−−− ⇐⇒
[θµ (1− s) + (1− α− β) + αµ]ly = αµ
lx =
(1−α−β)
αµ
αµ
θµ(1−s)+(1−α−β)+αµ
−−−−− ⇐⇒
ly =
αµ
θµ(1−s)+(1−α−β)+αµ
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
lx =
(1−α−β)
θµ(1−s)+(1−α−β)+αµ
−−−−− ⇐⇒
ly =
αµ
θµ(1−s)+(1−α−β)+αµ
lx =
(1−α−β)
θµ(1−s)+(1−α−β)+αµ (31)
l = (1−α−β)+αµ
θµ(1−s)+(1−α−β)+αµ (32)
ly =
αµ
θµ(1−s)+(1−α−β)+αµ (33)
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7.6 Optimal Monetary Policy and Friedman Rule
7.6.1 Socially Optimal Allocation
Imposing balanced growth on (11), yields that:
U =
1
ρ
[
lnc0 +
g
ρ
+ ln (1− lu)
]
(34)
where u = h, l, C0 = z0l = y and g = (ϕlnz)hr
U = 1
ρ
[
ln 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
βl1−α−βx +
(ϕlnz)
ρ
hr + θln (1− ly − lx) + θln (1− hy − hr)
]
To find the socially optimal allocations for high and low skill, we must maximize
the welfare to obtain the first best allocations.
∂U
∂hy
= [1
ρ
[
ln 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
βl1−α−βx +
(ϕlnz)
ρ
hr + θln (1− ly − lx) + θln (1− hy − hr)
]′
⇐⇒
∂U
∂hy
= 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
( 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx )′
1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx
+ θ (1−hy−hr)
′
(1−hy−hr) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
( 1
1−α−β l
α
y,tβ(γhy,t)
β−1γl1−α−βx )
1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx
+ θ −1
(1−hy−hr) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[ (β(γhy,t)
β−1γ)
(γhy,t)β
− θ
(1−hy−hr) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
(β
(γhy,t)
β
γhy,t
γ)
(γhy,t)β
− θ
(1−hy−hr) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[( β
hy,t
)− θ
(1−hy−hr) ] = 0⇐⇒
( β
hy,t
)− θ
(1−hy−hr) = 0⇐⇒
( β
hy,t
) = θ
(1−hy−hr) ⇐⇒
β(1− hy − hr) = θhy,t ⇐⇒
(1− hy − hr) = θβhy,t ⇐⇒
(1− hr) = ( θβ + 1)hy
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∂U
∂hr
= [1
ρ
[
ln 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
βl1−α−βx +
(ϕlnz)
ρ
hr + θln (1− ly − lx) + θln (1− hy − hr)
]′
⇐⇒
∂U
∂hr
= 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[( (ϕlnz)
ρ
hr)
′ + θ (1−hy−hr)
′
(1−hy−hr) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[( (ϕlnz)
ρ
) + θ −1
(1−hy−hr) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[( (ϕlnz)
ρ
)− θ
(1−hy−hr) ] = 0⇐⇒
[( (ϕlnz)
ρ
)− θ
(1−hy−hr) ] = 0⇐⇒
(ϕlnz)
ρ
= θ
(1−hy−hr) ⇐⇒
(ϕlnz) (1− hy − hr) = θρ⇐⇒
(1− hy − hr) = θρ(ϕlnz)
(1− hr) = ( θβ + 1)hy
⇐⇒
(1− hy − hr) = θρ(ϕlnz)
−−−−−
⇐⇒(
( θ
β
+ 1)hy − hy
)
= θρ
(ϕlnz)
−−−−−
⇐⇒
( θ
β
)hy =
θρ
(ϕlnz)
−−−−−
⇐⇒
hy =
ρβ
(ϕlnz)
(1− hr) = ( θβ + 1) ρβ(ϕlnz)
⇐⇒
hy =
ρβ
(ϕlnz)
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
(1− hr) = θρ(ϕlnz) + ρβ(ϕlnz)
⇐⇒
−−−−−
(1− hr) = θρ(ϕlnz) + ρβ(ϕlnz)
⇐⇒
−−−−−
−hr = θρ(ϕlnz) + ρβ(ϕlnz) − 1
⇐⇒
−−−−−
h∗r = 1− (θ+β)ρ(ϕlnz) (35)
⇐⇒
h∗y =
ρβ
(ϕlnz)
(36)
Finally,
h∗ = h∗r + h
∗
y ⇐⇒
h∗ = 1− (θ+β)ρ
(ϕlnz)
+ ρβ
(ϕlnz)
⇐⇒
h∗ = 1− θρ
(ϕlnz)
(37)
∂U
∂lx
= [1
ρ
[
ln 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
βl1−α−βx +
(ϕlnz)
ρ
hr + θln (1− ly − lx) + θln (1− hy − hr)
]′
⇐⇒
∂U
∂lx
= 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
( 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx )′
1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx
+ θ (1−ly−lx)
′
(1−ly−lx) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
( 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β(1−α−β)l−α−βx )
1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx
+ θ (1−ly−lx)
′
(1−ly−lx) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[ (1−α−β)l
−α−β
x )
l1−α−βx
+ θ (−1)
(1−ly−lx) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[ (1−α−β)
l1−α−β+α+βx
− θ
(1−ly−lx) ] = 0⇐⇒
(1−α−β)
lx
− θ
(1−ly−lx) = 0⇐⇒
(1−α−β)
ρlx
= θ
ρ(1−ly−lx) ⇐⇒
(1−α−β)
lx
= θ
(1−ly−lx) ⇐⇒
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(1− α− β) (1− ly − lx) = θlx ⇐⇒
(1− α− β) (1− ly) = (θ + (1− α− β))lx ⇐⇒
lx =
(1−α−β)
(θ+(1−α−β)) (1− ly)
∂U
∂ly
= [1
ρ
[
ln 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
βl1−α−βx +
(ϕlnz)
ρ
hr + θln (1− ly − lx) + θln (1− hy − hr)
]′
⇐⇒
∂U
∂ly
= 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
( 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx )′
1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx
+ θ (1−ly−lx)
′
(1−ly−lx) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
( 1
1−α−βαl
α−1
y,t (γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx )
1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx
+ θ (−1)
(1−ly−lx) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
( 1
1−α−βαl
α−1
y,t (γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx )
( 1
1−α−β )l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
β l1−α−βx
− θ
(1−ly−lx) ] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
α
lαy
ly
lαy
− θ
(1−ly−lx) ] = 0⇐⇒
α
ρly
− θ
ρ(1−ly−lx) = 0⇐⇒
α
ly
− θ
(1−ly−lx) = 0⇐⇒
α
ly
= θ
(1−ly−lx) ⇐⇒
α (1− ly − lx) = θly ⇐⇒
α (1− lx)− αly = θly ⇐⇒
θly + αly = α (1− lx)⇐⇒
(θ + α)ly = α (1− lx)⇐⇒
ly =
α
(θ+α)
(1− lx)
ly =
α
(θ+α)
(1− lx)
⇐⇒
lx =
(1−α−β)
(θ+(1−α−β)) (1− ly)
ly =
α
(θ+α)
− α
(θ+α)
lx
⇐⇒
lx =
(1−α−β)
(θ+(1−α−β)) (1− ly)
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
ly =
α
(θ+α)
− α
(θ+α)
[ (1−α−β)
(θ+(1−α−β)) (1− ly)]
⇐⇒
−−−−−
ly =
α
(θ+α)
− α(1−α−β)
(θ+α)(θ+(1−α−β)) +
α(1−α−β)
(θ+α)(θ+(1−α−β)) ly
⇐⇒
−−−−−
ly − α(1−α−β)(θ+α)(θ+(1−α−β)) ly = α(θ+α) − α(1−α−β)(θ+α)(θ+(1−α−β))
⇐⇒
−−−−−
(θ+α)(θ+(1−α−β))−α(1−α−β)
(θ+α)(θ+(1−α−β)) ly =
α(θ+(1−α−β))
(θ+α)(θ+(1−α−β)) −
α(1−α−β)
(θ+α)(θ+(1−α−β))
⇐⇒
−−−−−
[(θ + α)(θ + (1− α− β))− α(1− α− β)]ly = αθ
⇐⇒
−−−−−
[(θ + α)θ + θ(1− α− β) + α(1− α− β)− α(1− α− β)]ly = αθ
⇐⇒
−−−−−
[θθ + αθ + θ − θα− θβ]ly = αθ
⇐⇒
−−−−−
[θ(θ + 1− β)]ly = αθ
⇐⇒
−−−−−
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
ly =
αθ
θ(θ+1−β)
⇐⇒
−−−−−
ly =
α
(1+θ−β)
⇐⇒
−−−−−
Therefore, lxwill be:
α
(1+θ−β) =
α
(θ+α)
− α
(θ+α)
lx ⇐⇒
α
(θ+α)
lx =
α
(θ+α)
− α
(1+θ−β) ⇐⇒
lx =
(θ+α)
(θ+α)
− (θ+α)
(1+θ−β) ⇐⇒
lx = 1− (θ+α)(1+θ−β) ⇐⇒
lx =
(1+θ−β)−(θ+α)
(1+θ−β) ⇐⇒
lx =
1−β−α
1+θ−β
l∗y =
α
(1+θ−β) (38)
l∗x =
1−β−α
1+θ−β (39)
As for high skill labor, l∗ = l∗y + l
∗
x:
l∗ = l∗y + l
∗
x ⇐⇒
l∗ = α
1+θ−β +
1−β−α
1+θ−β ⇐⇒
l∗ = 1−β
1+θ−β (40)
7.6.2 Friedman Rule Under Inelastic Labor Supply
Under the inelastic labor supply, θ = 0, so the welfare function will be:
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U = 1
ρ
[
ln 1
1−α−β l
α
y,t(γhy,t)
βl1−α−βx +
(ϕlnz)
ρ
hr
]
As the interest rate only affects the high skill labor, the optimal interest rate
will be found through the high skill allocations, therefore the welfare function will
turn into:
U = 1
ρ
[
βlnhy +
(ϕlnz)
ρ
hr
]
Note that, if we simply the welfare function in respect to i, we will get:
U = 1
ρ
[
ln 1
1−α−β + αlnly,t + βln(γhy,t) + (1− α− β)lnlx + (ϕlnz)ρ hr
]
⇐⇒
U = 1
ρ
[
ln 1
1−α−β + αlnly,t + βln(γ) + βln(hy,t) + (1− α− β)lnlx + (ϕlnz)ρ hr
]
⇐⇒
As ln 1
1−α−β , αlnly,t, βln(γ) and (1− α − β)lnlx are not affected by i, when the
maximization of the welfare function occur, these variables are simplified, so the
function will simply be:
U = 1
ρ
[
βlnhy +
(ϕlnz)
ρ
hr
]
With θ = 0:
hy =
(1+i)β
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β (
ρ
ϕ
+ 1) (41)
hr =
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β (
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
(42)
U = 1
ρ
[
βln[ (1+i)β
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β (
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)] + (ϕlnz)
ρ
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β (
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
]
⇐⇒
∂U
∂i
= 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[β
[
(1+i)β
(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+it)β
( ρ
ϕ
+1)]′
[
(1+i)β
(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+it)β
( ρ
ϕ
+1)]
+ ( (ϕlnz)
ρ
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β (
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
)′] = 0⇐⇒
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1
ρ
[β
[
β[(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)β]−((1+i)β)β
[(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)β]2
( ρ
ϕ
+1)]
[
(1+i)β
(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)β
( ρ
ϕ
+1)]
+( (ϕlnz)
ρ
−β(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β]2 (
ρ
ϕ
+1)] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[β[
β[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
(1+i)β[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)β] ] +
−β(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β]2 (1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz] = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
β[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
(1+i)
− β(
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β](1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz] = 0⇐⇒
β[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
(1+i)
=
β(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β](1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz ⇐⇒
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)β]
(1+i)
= (1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz ⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(1+i)
+
(1+it)β
(1+i)
= (1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz ⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(1+i)
+ β = (1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz ⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(1+i)
= (1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz − β ⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−β = (1 + i)⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−β − 1 = i⇐⇒
i =
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−β − 1⇐⇒
i =
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)−(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−β
(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−β ⇐⇒
i∗ =
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)−[(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−β]
(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−β (43)
7.6.3 Friedman Rule Under Elastic Labor Supply
As under inelastic labor supply, under elastic labor supply, the interest rate will
only affect high skill workers. The welfare will become the following:
U = 1
ρ
[
βlnhy +
(ϕlnz)
ρ
hr + θln(1− hy − hr)
]
To simply the welfare function, lets consider the following notation:
Φ = βlnhy
Γ = (ϕlnz)
ρ
hr
Ψ = θln(1− hy − hr)
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Therefore:
U = 1
ρ
[Φ + Γ + Ψ]
Φ = βlnhy ⇐⇒
Φ = βln[ (1+it)β
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)(
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)]⇐⇒
∂Φ
∂i
= β
[
(1+i)β
(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)
( ρ
ϕ
+1)]′
[
(1+i)β
(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)
( ρ
ϕ
+1)]
⇐⇒
∂Φ
∂i
= β
[
β[(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)]−[(1+i)(θs+β)]β
[(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)]2
( ρ
ϕ
+1)]
[
(1+i)β
(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)
( ρ
ϕ
+1)]
⇐⇒
∂Φ
∂i
=
β[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)](1+i) ⇐⇒
Γ = (ϕlnz)
ρ
hr
Γ = (ϕlnz)
ρ
[
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
]⇐⇒
∂Γ
∂i
= (ϕlnz)
ρ
[
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
]′ ⇐⇒
∂Γ
∂i
= [
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)](1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz)− (ϕlnz)
ρ
ρ
ϕ
]′ ⇐⇒
∂Γ
∂i
= [
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)](1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz − lnz]′ ⇐⇒
∂Γ
∂i
= − (
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)(θs+β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)]2 (1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz ⇐⇒
Ψ = θln(1− hy − hr)⇐⇒
Ψ = θln(1− h)
(1− h) = [1− { (1+it)β+(
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)− ρ
ϕ
}]⇐⇒
(1− h) = [1 + ρ
ϕ
]− [ (1+it)β+(
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)]⇐⇒
(1− h) = [1− (1+it)β+(
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)] ](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)⇐⇒
(1− h) = [ (
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)−[(1+it)β+(µ−1µ )(1−α−β)]
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)] ](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)⇐⇒
(1− h) = [ (
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)−[(1+it)β+(µ−1µ )(1−α−β)]
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)] ](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)⇐⇒
(1− h) = (1+it)θs
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1)
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Ψ = θln(1− h)⇐⇒
Ψ = θln( (1+it)θs
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1))⇐⇒
∂Ψ
∂i
= [θln( (1+it)θs
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)](
ρ
ϕ
+ 1))]′ ⇐⇒
∂Ψ
∂i
= θ
(
(1+it)θs
[(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)]
( ρ
ϕ
+1))′
(
(1+it)θs
[(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+it)(θs+β)]
( ρ
ϕ
+1))
⇐⇒
∂Ψ
∂i
= θ
θs[(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)−(θs+β)(1+i)θs]
[(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)]2
( ρ
ϕ
+1)
(1+i)θs
[(
µ−1
µ )(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)]
( ρ
ϕ
+1)
⇐⇒
∂Ψ
∂i
=
θ[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
(1+i)[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)]
AsU = 1
ρ
[Φ + Γ + Ψ],
∂U
∂i
= 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[Φ + Γ + Ψ]′ = 0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
β[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)](1+i)−
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)(θs+β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)]2 (1+
ϕ
ρ
)lnz+
θ[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
(1+i)[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)] ] =
0⇐⇒
1
ρ
[
β[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)](1+i)−
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)(θs+β)
[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)]2 (1+
ϕ
ρ
)lnz+
θ[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
(1+i)[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)] ] =
0⇐⇒
(β+θ)[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
ρ(1+i)
− (
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)(θs+β)
ρ[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)](1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz = 0⇐⇒
(β+θ)[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)]
ρ(1+i)
− (
µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)(θs+β)
ρ[(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)](1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz = 0⇐⇒
(β+θ)
(1+i)
= (θs+β)
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)(1 +
ϕ
ρ
)lnz ⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)+(1+i)(θs+β)
(1+i)
= (θs+β)
(β+θ)
(1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz ⇐⇒
(1+i)(θs+β)
(1+i)
+
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(1+i)
= (θs+β)
(β+θ)
(1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz ⇐⇒
(θs+ β) +
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(1+i)
= (θs+β)
(β+θ)
(1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz ⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(1+i)
= (θs+β)
(β+θ)
(1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz − θs− β ⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(θs+β)
(β+θ)
(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−θs−β = (1 + i)⇐⇒
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)
(θs+β)
(β+θ)
(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−θs−β − 1 = i⇐⇒
i∗ =
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)−[ (θs+β)
(β+θ)
(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−θs−β]
(θs+β)
(β+θ)
(1+ϕ
ρ
)lnz−θs−β ⇐⇒
i∗ =
(µ−1
µ
)(1−α−β)−Ω
Ω
(44)
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With: Ω = (θs+β)
(β+θ)
(1 + ϕ
ρ
)lnz − θs− β (45)
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